Despite the enormous influence of Michel Foucault in gender studies, social theory, and cultural studies, his work has been relatively neglected in the study of politics. Although he never published a book on the state, in the late 1970s Foucault examined the technologies of power used to regulate society and the ingenious recasting of power and agency that he saw as both consequence and condition of their operation. These twelve essays provide a critical introduction to Foucault's work on politics, exploring (...) its relevance to past and current thinking about liberal and neo-liberal forms of government. Moving away from the great texts of liberal political philosophy, this book looks closely at the technical means with which the ideals of liberal political rationalities have been put into practice in such areas as schools, welfare, and the insurance industry. This fresh approach to one of the seminal thinkers of the twentieth century is essential reading for anyone interested in social and cultural theory, sociology, and politics. (shrink)

Foucault is often thought to have a great deal to say about the history of madness and sexuality, but little in terms of a general analysis of government and the state.; This volume draws on Foucault's own research to challenge this view, demonstrating the central importance of his work for the study of contemporary politics.; It focuses on liberalism and neo- liberalism, questioning the conceptual opposition of freedom/constraint, state/market and public/private that inform liberal thought.

Foucault is often thought to have a great deal to say about the history of madness and sexuality, but little in terms of a general analysis of government and the state.; This volume draws on Foucault's own research to challenge this view, demonstrating the central importance of his work for the study of contemporary politics.; It focuses on liberalism and neo- liberalism, questioning the conceptual opposition of freedom/constraint, state/market and public/private that inform liberal thought.

Introduction Of enlightenmentality Blackmail - Negative enlightenment - Critique of enlightenment - Postmodernism - Realism and enlightenment - Aspects of ...

This paper addresses the remarkable longevity of the idea of vitalism in the biological sciences and beyond. If there is to be a renewed vitalism today, however, we need to ask – on what kind of original conception of life should it be based? This paper argues that recent invocations of a generalized, processual variety of vitalism in the social sciences and humanities above all, however exciting in their scope, miss much of the basic originality – and interest – of (...) the vitalist perspective itself. The paper argues that any renewed spirit of vitalism in the contemporary era would have to base itself on the normativity of the living organism rather than on any generalized conceptions of process or becoming. In the terms of the paper, such a vitalism would have to be concrete and ‘disciplinary’ rather than processual or generalized. Such a vitalism would also need to accommodate, crucially, the pathic aspects of life – pathology, sickness, error; in short everything that makes us, as living beings, potentially weak, without power, at a loss. Sources for such a pathic vitalism might be found above all in the work of Georges Canguilhem – and Friedrich Nietzsche – rather than primarily in Bergson, Whitehead or Deleuze. (shrink)

This article revisits the long-standing question of the relations between ethics and politics in Machiavelli’s work, assessing its relevance to the ‘liberalism of fear’ in particular in the work of Judith Shklar, Bernard Williams and also John Dunn. The article considers ways in which Machiavelli has been a ‘negative’ resource for liberalism – for instance, as a presumed proponent of tyranny; but also ways in which even for the liberalism of fear he might be considered a ‘positive’ resource, above all (...) around the issues of political necessity and prudential judgement. (shrink)

Who is speaking in the history of social thought? The question of the authentic voice of social thought is typically posed in terms that tend to be either ambitiously theoretical or carefully methodological. Thus histories of social thought frequently offer either a résumé of general ideas about society (say from Montesquieu to Parsons) or a survey which gets bogged down in a rather tedious, nit-picking debate about empirical methodology. This paper is something of a preview of a pro jected attempt (...) on the part of the authors to capture the voice of social thought in rather different terms. Our three theses are: (1) that those who speak 'in the name of society' have just as frequently been doctors and bureaucrats as opposed to 'social philosophers' or professional sociologists; correlatively, (2) that the creative voice of social thought has more often been technical, problem-centred and tied up with par ticular rationalities of government as opposed to being either exclu sively theoretical or merely responsive to 'objective problems' in society; and, (3) that if sociology today struggles for a voice in which to speak this may be in some part due to the ways in which the past history of social thought has typically been conceived. (shrink)

This article addresses the question of utopia through some reflections on the work of the Russian writer Andrei Platonov (1899-1951). Platonov's work represents an inspirational series of investigations into the circumstances of utopia: not so much utopia as fantasy, nor utopia as actualized in failure, nor even dystopia, but what is here termed `actually existing utopia'. As such his work captures aspects of utopianism that may have been largely opaque to the investigations of either literary versions of the utopian imagination (...) or utopian versions of social science. Platonov shows us an `anthropological' dimension inherent within the utopian impulse: that we are, so to speak, `utopological' beings. And to this dimension of ourselves he applies a critical style that is not straightforwardly anti-utopian or dystopian but what is called here `counter-utopian'. (shrink)

Are we humans destined to become ‘posthuman’? In this paper, we question the claims of posthumanism, accepting some of its broader insights whilst proposing a more empirically and ethically appropriate ‘vitalist’ response. We argue that despite recent changes in styles of thought that question the uniqueness of ‘the human’, and despite novel technological developments for augmenting human bodies, we remain – fundamentally – persons. Humans, as persons, are constitutively embedded in and scaffolded by the material, social, semantic and cultural niches (...) they have constructed for themselves. An ‘ethopolitical’ response to our present that recognizes this fact not only requires us to engage with the consequences of making lives in the unequal niches that restrict and stunt the personhood of so many human beings at present, but also requires us to broaden the bandwidth of those who are recognized fully as persons. In our conclusion we briefly develop the theme that this emphasis on personhood can be seen as a vitalist – rather than a humanist – stance. (shrink)

The principle of moderation can be regarded as an ethical principle of virtue or as a principle of government. On the basis of the former, moderation has a personal, ethical sense—not to go towards extremes. The latter model is more generalized and impersonal: moderation as the limitation of power by power. Both conceptions actually meet, though with the latter model more salient, in the work of Montesquieu. This article outlines Montesquieu’s view of moderation emphasizing the extent to which this view (...) cannot be understood apart from his concept of despotism. It shows that Montesquieu’s understanding of moderation entails the balancing and interaction of different powers in a State. As such, his view is more “dynamic” and relational than “substantive.” By exploring the interaction between the models of moderation as virtue and moderation as government in Montesquieu’s work, I then develop the notion of “ruling fear” in considering the continuing relevance of Montesquieu’s perspective for current understandings of moderation and political power. (shrink)

During the last fifteen years some theologians during have supported their understanding of how unbelievers might be saved by appealing to Thomas Aquinas and the development of his thought in by sixteenth-century Dominicans at Salamanca. These Salamancan Dominicans applied Thomas’ thought in the context of the New World’s discovery. These recent theologians attribute two claims to this tradition: first, that not every unbeliever is guilty of unbelief, and second, that unbelievers can perform good acts which in some strong manner enable (...) them to receive grace. I shall argue that although the first claim about the culpability of unbelief is held by the Thomist tradition, it has no historical or logical connection to the salvation of unbelievers. I shall argue that the second claim was not held by the tradition and that the contemporary misinterpretation results from a confusion over the relationship between moral goodness and merit. Whereas the first claim is historically accurate but irrelevant to the contemporary views for which it is invoked, the second claim is historically false if attributed to Thomas Aquinas or the Dominican tradition at Salamanca. (shrink)

(2003). Contemporary ‘vehicularity’ and ‘romanticism’: debating the status of ideas and intellectuals. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy: Vol. 6, The Public Role of Intellectuals, pp. 51-66. doi: 10.1080/1369823042000241267.

Professor Thomas Osborne and The Structure of Modern Cultural Theory visited Prague in mid-2018 and presented a paper On Montesquieu, Markets and the Liberalism of Fear. The interview was conducted online by Dr. Filip Vostal in autumn 2020.

Available from UMI in association with The British Library. ;This thesis traces endeavours in the twentieth century to provide the 'intellectual' foundations for general medical practice as an independent, autonomous clinical discipline. The empirical focus of the study is upon the application of psychological and 'person-centred' approaches to general practice; above all, in the work of Michael Balint, and the Royal College of General Practitioners in the post-war period. The thesis is guided by two predominant theoretical concerns. First, to highlight (...) the complex strategies and the wide range of means and resources that have been required to give substance to the claim that general practice is 'by nature' a person-centred endeavour. Second, to consider--and to question--certain influential approaches to medical power in general, and to the social consequences of 'emancipatory'--person-centred--forms of medicine in particular. Specifically, the 'power/knowledge' approach to medical sociology is contested both with regard to its empirical findings and in relation to its basis in the work of Michel Foucault . ;The study which follows is intended neither as a narrative history of general practice nor as a history of ideas about general practice. Its empirical concern is more specific than either of these. Focusing upon the twentieth century and above all the post-war period, it seeks to analyse some of the ways in which general practitioners have sought to autonomise their discipline by giving it an 'intellectual' basis. If the 'general practitioner' has long existed as a professional label then nevertheless notions of what unifies the general practitioner's activities have undergone a degree of mutation. It is these 'models' of general practice--physiological, epidemiological, psychological--which will be investigated here. As such, the purpose behind the study is partly of a 'methodological' order. The study seeks to show that what counts in evolving a coherent model of general practice is not just the provision of a 'representation' of the general practitioner's activities but a construction on several levels. (shrink)